










Growth and Earnings Persistence in Banking 




Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad 




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2772 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Growth and Earnings Persistence in Banking 





This paper investigates (i) whether growth and profitability persist in banking firms, (ii) 
whether the level and volatility of growth and profitability are bank-size dependent, and (iii) 
the relationship between growth and profitability of a bank. Using a dynamic panel model 
estimated by GMM for a mixed sample of more than 1500 banks from 65 countries, we find 
no evidence of persistence in bank growth. However, our findings suggest significant 
persistence in bank profitability. Moreover, our results show that the growth and profitability 
dynamics of banks based in OECD countries differ from those of banks in non-OECD 
countries. 
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Does firm growth depend on firm size and is firm growth persistent? Although there are 
many studies analyzing these questions for non-banking firms, there are only few papers 
that focus on banking firms. Still, these issues are important for the banking sector as 
well. For instance, persistence of high growth rates of banking firms would result in a 
highly concentrated banking industry.  
  The literature on this topic has been significantly influenced by Gibrat’s (1931) 
‘Law of Proportionate Effect’. The strong version of Gibrat’s ‘law’ consists of three 
propositions: (i) the growth rate of each firm over some period is independent of its size; 
(ii) the variability of a firm’s growth rate is independent of the firm’s size, and (iii) the 
firm’s growth rates in two consecutive periods are independent of each other. Together 
these propositions imply that the firm’s growth rate follows a random walk. The most 
extensive work to date on Gibrat’s ‘law’ for banking firms are the studies by Goddard et 
al. (2004a, 2004b). These authors not only examined Gibrat’s ‘law’, but also analyzed the 
relationship between bank growth and profitability. The two indicators of bank 
performance are obviously related. Retained earnings are, for instance, a principal source 
of capital and in a regulatory system requiring banks to meet various capital adequacy 
requirements profit therefore enables the expansion of a bank’s portfolio of risky assets.  
This paper investigates the interactions between firm growth and profitability, 
using a data set comprising more than 1500 banks located in 65 countries. We examine 
the following questions: (i) Are growth and earnings patterns in banking firms persistent? 
(ii) Are growth and earnings affected by bank size? (iii) Are growth volatility and 
earnings volatility affected by bank size? and (iv) What is the relationship between bank 
earnings and bank growth? Growth and profit rates are observed annually over the period 
1997 to 2000, together with a set of control variables that capture the impact of firm-
level, industry-level, and macroeconomic variables. Dynamic panel regressions are used 
to estimate growth and profit equations following the approach of Blundel and Bond 
(1998). 
Our results suggest that bank growth is not persistent, in contrast to bank 
profitability. The latter finding is in contrast to the results reported by Goddard et al. 
(2004a,b). Additionally, we find that large banks in OECD economies grow at a slower   3
speed than smaller banks, but bank size does not influence bank growth in non-OECD 
economies.  
This paper extends previous work like that of Tschoegl (1983), Hameeteman and 
Scholtens (2000), Goddard et al. (2004a, 2004b), Athanasoglou (2005) and Benito (2008) 
in four directions. First, we examine a much bigger data set consisting of more than 1500 
banks from 65 countries for the period 1997-2007. Second, our dataset includes banks 
from various non-OECD economies, whereas previous research employed data for banks 
in OECD countries. Third, we focus on recent data. Using more recent data may lead to 
different results because the structure of the banking industry significantly changed also 
in OECD countries between 1997 and 2007, as we will show in our data section. Finally, 
the most recent papers in this area use the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure for 
estimating dynamic panel models. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in 
panels with a limited time period and many banks the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
approach produces biased estimates. Therefore, we apply an alternative methodology 
suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). Additionally, we extend the list of control 
variables. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the 
literature on bank growth and bank earnings and develops our model. Section 2 describes 
our data on bank growth, profitability, and size distribution. Section 3 presents the 
estimation results for the full sample, whereas section 4 examines differences between 
OECD and non-OECD countries. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1. BANK GROWTH AND EARNINGS PATTERNS 
 
Tschoegl (1983) tested Gibrat’s ‘Law of Proportionate Effect’ for the 100 largest banks 
of the world from 1969 to 1977 and concludes that the growth rate of these banks is 
independent of their size. However, the variability of bank growth rate declines with an 
increase in bank size. Additionally, he does not find any clear results regarding the 
relationship between bank growth rates in two consecutive periods. More recently, Benito 
(2008) tested Gibrat’s ‘law’ for Spanish banks using panel unit root tests and finds that   4
the size-growth relationship is not stable over time but depends on the competitive 
environment.    
Research on Gibrat’s ‘law’ originally focused on growth, while a separate strand 
of the literature examined the linkage between size and profitability in banking. These 
studies focused on profitability and not on the persistence and dynamics of earnings. For 
instance, analyzing the effect of bank size on bank performance, Stein (2002) and Berger 
et al. (2005) report that small banks have better abilities to allocate capital and to collect 
and act on ‘soft’ information regarding their borrowers. However, Stever (2007) finds 
lower betas for small banks and attributes this result to lower firm diversification. Some 
papers do not identify a strong link between market structure and profitability. For 
instance, Athanasoglu et al. (2005) study the effect of bank-specific, industry-specific, 
and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability using the GMM technique for a 
panel of Greek banks covering the period 1985-2001. They find that all bank-specific 
determinants, except for size, affect bank profitability significantly in the anticipated 
way.  
Goddard et al. (2004a, 2004b) combine both strands of the literature. They use 
panel and cross-sectional regressions to estimate growth and profit models for a sample 
of almost 600 banks from five European Union countries over the period 1992-1998. The 
authors find that profit is an important prerequisite for future growth. When banks 
become larger, their growth performance tends to improve further. Finally, growth 
persistence tends to be higher for savings and co-operative banks than for commercial 
banks.   
The model tested by Goddard et al. (2004b) to examine the linkages between bank 
size, growth, and profitability provides an interesting framework. We therefore take this 
model as our starting point, but will introduce some adjustments for econometric and 
theoretical reasons. Bank growth will follow a random walk with drift if all the three 
propositions of Gibrat’s ‘law’ hold: 
  1 it it i t it SS α δε − − =+ +                (1) 
Where  it S  indicates the log of the size of bank i in year t,  1 it S −  indicates the log of the size 
of bank i in year t-1, and iti t α δε ++ indicates that logarithmic bank growth follows a 
random walk with drift where  it α δ + are individual bank and time effects, respectively.   5
We can rewrite equation (1) as follows: 
11 (1 ) it it i t it it SS S α δβ ε −− − =+ +− +           (2) 
Where parameter β indicates the relationship between the log of bank size and annual 
growth. To examine the effect of growth in the previous period, we introduce a lagged 
dependent variable in the model:  
11 1 2 (1 ) ( ) it it i t it it it it SS S S S α δβ γ ε −− − − − =+ +− + − +            (3) 
Using this model, we can test our first three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Bank growth is independent of bank size 
 










− ≠  
The null hypothesis corresponds to Gibrat’s proposition that the growth rate of each bank 
is independent of its size. If β >1, i.e. bigger banks grow faster, concentration will 
increase and the distribution of bank sizes will become highly skewed.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Bank growth variability is independent of bank size 
 
To test this proposition, we need to examine whether banks are homogeneous, i.e. 














The null hypothesis corresponds to Gibrat’s second proposition and indicates that bank 
size does not affect growth volatility. To test this hypothesis we plot residuals from our 
models against bank size and check if there is any systemic variation in residuals with 
different bank size.
1 
                                                 
1 A satisfactory testing procedure for this hypothesis for dynamic panel models with small T and large N 
samples is not available. The test recently proposed by Sarfidis et al. (2009) is also not suitable here   6
  
Hypothesis 3: Bank growth is not persistent 
 












The third null hypothesis corresponds to Gibrat’s third proposition and indicates that 
current growth does not depend on past growth.   
 
Goddard et al. (2004b) extend equation (3) by adding lagged profit as an explanatory 
variable: 
 
11 1 2 1 (1 ) ( ) it it i t it it it it it SS S S S α δβ γ ϕ ε −− − − − −= + + − + − + ∏ +            (4) 
 
where  1 it− ∏  indicates profit of bank i in year t-1. Using this extended model, we can test 
our fourth hypothesis about the linkage between profitability and bank growth.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Bank profitability has no effect on bank growth  
 












We include various control variables that will be explained in some detail in the next 
section. The model therefore becomes:  
 
11 1 2 1 (1 ) ( ) it it i t it it it it it it SS S S S X α δβ γ ϕ ζ ε −− − − − −= + + − + − + ∏ + +         (5) 
 
where  it X  is a matrix of control variables for bank i in year t. 
As long as banks are homogeneous, i.e. αi = α, this specification gives unbiased 
estimates of the model by pooling the data. However, if banks are not homogeneous, 
                                                                                                                                                   
because we are interested in the variation of residuals against bank size and not the cross sectional 
dependence itself.   7
Breitung and Meyer (1994) show that (β – 1) becomes a biased and inconsistent 
estimator. Instead they suggest transforming equation (5) as follows: 
11 0 1 2 1 1 (1 ) ( )( ) it it it i it it it it it S S SS SS X β γϕ ζ ξ −−− − − −=− −+ − + ∏ + +      (6) 
where  10 it i it i S ξ αε β =++ . This provides an unbiased and consistent estimation of our 
model. In equation (6), instead of taking the lagged size as the explanatory variable, we 
take the difference of lagged size and initial bank size. Breitung and Meyer (1994) show 
that after this transformation (β – 1) is not affected by heterogeneity.  
Now we have derived our model for bank growth. By following the same steps, 
we can derive our model for profitability. So equation (7) below gives the model for the 
dynamic analysis of profitability: 
10 1 2 2 (1 ) ( )( ) it it i it it it it SS X ππ π π β γζ ξ −− − ∏ =− ∏ − ∏ + − + +        (7) 
where  20 it i it i π ππ π ξ αε β =++ ∏ . This model will be used to test hypotheses 1-4 using 
profitability instead of bank growth as dependent variable. 
  Arellano and Bond (1991) show that due to the presence of individual bank 
effects and the lagged dependent variable, OLS or fixed effects models cannot be used for 
estimating equations (6) and (7). Goddard  et al. (2004a; 2004b) therefore use the 
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach as suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that if the dependent 
variable is close to a random walk, the difference GMM approach performs poorly, 
because past levels convey little information about future changes. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) suggest transforming the differences of the regressors to make them exogenous to 
the fixed effects instead of transforming the regressors. Especially for small T and large 
N in an unbalanced panel setting, the Arellano and Bond (1991) method produces biased 
estimates. As our dataset covers a short period of time, contains many banks and is 
unbalanced, we estimate equations (6) and (7) by the system GMM approach suggested 
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2. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
The banking data for our analysis come from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope database 
(December 2008) version. The data refer to 1997-2007 and cover commercial banks 
operating in more than 65 countries (29 OECD countries and 36 emerging market 
countries). Table A1 in the appendix provides the number of banks for each of the 
countries in our sample. To avoid double counting of banks, we include only banks with 
consolidated statements. Moreover, to keep the sample homogeneous we only consider 
commercial banks. We also deliberately exclude banks with a negative equity to asset 
ratio. After accounting for these changes, our final sample includes more than 3,900 
observations for more than 1,500 banks.  
We use bank assets as a proxy for bank size and return on average equity as a 
proxy for bank profitability. We include three bank-specific control variables.
2 They 
account for the capital structure of the bank (i.e., equity/assets ratio), managerial 
efficiency of the banks (i.e., overhead costs to net income ratio) and stability of bank 
earnings (i.e., recurring earning power). The first control variable measures the portion of 
assets financed by equity. The higher this ratio, the higher the capital adequacy of the 
bank concerned will be. The second control variable measures the overhead costs to net 
income. If a bank has higher overhead costs as a ratio of net income, its profitability 
declines. The third control variable measures recurring earning power as a proxy of 
stability of earnings.
3 As such, the recurring earning power reflects net income from the 
core business of the bank. Additionally, to incorporate macroeconomic conditions and the 
structure of the financial sector, we include real GDP growth, inflation, and bank 
concentration.
4 Table 1 provides definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables 
and their sources. 
                                                 
2 The bank-specific control variables are similar to those used by Goddard et al. (2004b) except for two 
major differences. First, we use overhead costs to income of banks and recurring earnings power as two 
additional variables. These variables incorporate managerial efficiency and earnings stability in the 
analysis. Furthermore, two variables used by Goddard et al. (2004b), namely off-balance sheet business of 
the bank and liquidity, are not used in our model for two reasons. In the first place, both of these variables 
appeared insignificant for commercial banks in the model of Goddard et al. (2004b). In the second place, 
the availability of data is limited and inclusion would significantly reduce the number of observations.  
3 This variable is very different from our dependent variable: the correlation of both variables is only 0.37. 
4 Different from Goddard et al. (2004b), we include inflation in the model, as we want to control for the 
effect of an increasing or decreasing price level on bank assets and profitability.    9
TABLE 1 
VARIABLES: DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable:  Definition: Source: 
Assets Bank  Assets  (in US$ 10000) Bankscope 
Equity Bank  Equity  (in US$ 10000) Bankscope 
Asset Growth    1 () ( ) tt Log Assets Log Assets − −   Bankscope 
Return on Assets  Returns as a ratio of bank assets   Bankscope 
Return on Equity  Returns as a ratio of bank equity  Bankscope 
Overhead Costs/Net Income 
The ratio of overhead bank costs to net income ratio. 
Overhead refers to expenses that are necessary to the 
continued functioning, but do not directly generate 
profits. 
Bankscope 
Recurring Earning Power 
This is an adjusted ratio of stable net income to assets 
and excludes non-stable earnings and taxes from net 
income before the calculation of the ratio.  
Bankscope 
Equity/Assets 
As equity is a cushion against asset malfunction, this 
ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to 
the bank by the equity they invested in it. The higher 
this figure the more protection there is. 
Bankscope 
Real GDP Growth    1 (e ) (e ) tt Log r alGDP Log r alGDP− −   World Bank World Development Indicators 
Inflation 
Change in Consumer Price Index. To adjust for 







World Bank World Development Indicators 
Concentration  Fraction of Assets held by three largest banks  Beck  et al. (2000) - Financial Structures Database   10
 
TABLE 2  
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable:  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Assets (in US$ 10000) 25.70  280.84  0.00  9730.00  7,783 
Equity (in US$ 10000) 2.79 35.87  0.00  1250.00  7,765 
Asset Growth  0.17  0.47  -6.92  4.66  5,759 
Return on Assets  1.11  4.76  -111.13  73.17  7,720 
Return on Equity  9.85  30.87  -927.38  615.39  7,699 
Overhead Costs/Income  3.74  30.69  -1668.39  702.54  7,526 
Recurring Earning Power  2.13  4.93  -81.09  96.30  7,713 
Equity/Assets 15.68  17.96  0.00  100.00  7,765 
Real GDP Growth  0.03  0.02  -0.14  0.26  715 
Inflation 0.03  0.04  -0.09  0.61  715 
Concentration 0.41  0.22  0.20  1.00  715 
 
   11
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of our data and Table A2 in the appendix 
provides the correlation matrix of the variables. The correlations between the explanatory 
variables are low suggesting that multicolinearity is not a problem.  
  Many of our data come from Bankscope. However, Bankscope has been criticized 
for being not sufficiently representative of the banking systems of the countries covered 
(see, for instance, Bhattacharya, 2003). To check whether our sample is sufficiently 
representative we compare our sample of banks in terms of return on assets and return on 
equity with the World Bank Financial Structure database of Beck et al. (2000).
5 As Table 
A3 in the appendix shows, the averages in our sample are very similar to the overall 
banking sector statistics in the World Bank dataset. One possible reason for the small 
differences is that our sample is based on commercial banks only, whereas the World 
Bank sample also includes investment, co-operative, and micro-finance banks.  
   As we are using a large dataset of banking firms, it is useful to discuss some 
developments in bank size in the period under investigation. Bank size distribution as 
measured by assets is highly skewed towards the right, i.e., there are many small banks 
and only a few large banks. This pattern is so clear that a normal plot of bank size is not 
informative (see also Janicki and Prescott, 2006). Therefore, we show the log of bank size 
for all OECD and non-OECD banks in our sample over the period 1997-2007 in Figure 1 
and Figure 2, respectively. Additionally, we present year-wise skewness, kurtosis and 
Jarque-Bera test statistics for both OECD and non-OECD countries in Table A4 in the 
appendix. Our findings suggest that over the period 1997-2007, the size distribution of 
banks in the OECD countries converged to the lognormal distribution but this does not 
hold true for non-OECD countries. In OECD countries the leptokurtosis was reduced, but 
in non-OECD countries logarithmic bank sizes are still peaked, although there is a trend 
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Fig. 2 Density of the log of bank size for non-OECD countries     13
3. ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
 
 
The estimation results for the full sample are presented in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 and 
Table 4 for bank growth and bank profitability, respectively. In model 1 in Table 3 bank 
growth is regressed on lagged growth and lagged bank size. In model 2, lagged 
profitability is taken up as an explanatory variable, whereas in model 3 all explanatory 
variables are included. The Wald Chi-squared test is significant at the 1 percent level of 
significance and the Hansen test of over-identifying restriction appears insignificant. The 
null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the population moment conditions are correct 
and failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates the validity and exogeneity of the 
instruments.
6 For the consistent estimation of the models, a crucial condition is that the 
error terms are serially uncorrelated. More specifically,  it ξ Δ  should be uncorrelated
7 with 
, it k ξ − Δ  for  2 k ≥  and this can be examined by the Arellano-Bond test for first and second 
difference autoregressive processes. The test for the first difference autoregressive 
process appears significant, whereas it is insignificant for the second difference indicating 
that error terms are serially uncorrelated in our models.   
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 provide results for the bank profitability models 
corresponding to equation (7) for the full sample. In model 1, profitability of a bank is 
regressed on lagged profitability only. In model 2, bank size is taken up as an explanatory 
variable, and in model 3 all explanatory variables are included. The Wald Chi-squared 
test is again significant at the 1 percent level of significance and the Hansen test of over-
identifying restriction appears insignificant, suggesting the validity and exogeneity of the 
instruments. Similar to the models for bank growth, the Arellano-Bond test for the first 
difference autoregressive process appears to be significant and the second difference 
appears to be insignificant. 
 
                                                 
6 It may be important to mention here that in some models, the Sargan test for the instrument invalidity 
appears significant. However, as pointed out by Roodman (2006), the Sargan test can be inconsistent, 
because of the non-sphericity of errors and in that case the Hansen statistic from two-step estimate, which 
we report in our tables, is a better test. 
7 If errors are serially uncorrelated  , it ξ Δ  are correlated with  ,1 it ξ − Δ  but not with  , it k ξ − Δ  for  2 k ≥ .    14
Hypothesis 1: Bank growth (profitability) is independent of bank size 
To test this hypothesis, we examine the coefficient of logarithmic bank size (β-1). For the 
bank growth equation, the models 1-3 in Table 3 show that this coefficient has a negative 
sign, which implies that large banks grow slower than small banks. This finding is 
consistent with our observation that bank sizes converge to the lognormal distribution but 
contradicts the findings of Goddard et al. (2004b) who report a positive impact of bank 
size on bank growth. For the profitability equation results in Table 4, models 2-3 reveal 
that bank size does not affect profitability. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
β = 0. This finding suggests that bank profitability is not affected by bank size. This result 
is very similar to the findings of Goddard et al. (2004a) and Athanasoglu et al. (2005). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bank growth (profitability) variability is independent of bank size  
To examine the effect of bank size on variability of bank growth and profitability, we plot 
the residuals of our models 1-3 (as reported in columns (1)-(3) of Tables 3 and 4 for the 
full sample) in Figures 3 and 4 for growth and profitability, respectively. The residuals 
from the bank growth models 1 and 2 do not suggest any systematic variation in the 
residuals. In model 3, the test for the normality of the residuals shows no significant trend 
as well. So hypothesis 2 is not rejected for bank growth. On the other hand, in the bank 
profitability models, we find that variation in profitability is slightly higher for smaller 
banks compared to large banks.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Bank growth (profitability) is not persistent 
In Table 3, where we present the results for bank growth, lagged bank growth appears 
insignificant in all three formulations of the model, implying no persistence in bank 
growth. So hypothesis 3 can be rejected for bank growth. On the other hand, lagged bank 
profitability appears to be significant in all three models in Table 4, indicating persistence 
of bank profitability. This result is similar to the findings of Goddard et al. (2004a; 
2004b). Our results imply that lagged bank growth has no predictive power for current 
bank growth.    15
 
Hypothesis 4: Bank profitability (growth) has no effect on bank growth (profitability)  
In some specifications as reported in Table 3, bank profitability predicts the bank’s 
growth but this result is not robust as in the full model significance of profitability is 
rejected. However, in the model for bank profitability the coefficient of lagged growth is 
significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that banks growing faster in the previous 
period tend to have higher profitability in the current period.   16
 
TABLE 3  
DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS BANK GROWTH)  
      Full sample   OECD Countries  Non-OECD Countries 
      (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Bank Growth (t-1)  Coefficient  0.33  0.009  -0.015  0.143  0.23  0.012  0.817***  0.112  -0.187* 
    Std.  Error  0.215  0.243  0.044 0.675 0.413 0.047  0.306  0.25  0.101 
Bank  Size  (t-1)  Coefficient  -0.095*** -0.058* -0.515**  -0.094*  -0.084***  -0.458*** -0.054  -0.049  -0.203 
    Std.  Error  0.027  0.032  0.202 0.056 0.024  0.11  0.048  0.034  0.148 
Return on Equity (t-1)  Coefficient    0.069**  -0.097    0.009  -0.035    0.081***  -0.01 
    Std.  Error    0.032  0.068  0.041  0.054    0.025  0.081 
Equity/Assets Ratio  Coefficient      -0.038**      -0.042***      -0.028* 
   Std. Error      0.019      0.013      0.016 
Overhead Costs/Income  Coefficient      -0.032      0      0.046* 
   Std. Error      0.029      0.008      0.023 
Real GDP Growth  Coefficient      2.381      9.428      1.344 
   Std. Error      2.248      6.765      1.518 
Inflation Coefficient      0.251      -8.087      1.56 
   Std. Error      2.477      12.261      2.476 
Recurring Earning Power  Coefficient      0.009      -0.001      -0.076 
   Std. Error      0.029      0.015      0.051 
Concentration Coefficient      -0.306      -0.482      0.576 
   Std. Error      0.771      0.751      0.717 
                    
Number of Observations     3972  3484  1879 2390 2054 1014  1582  1430  865 
Number of Banks     1569 1451 838 989 908 449  580  543  389 
Number of Instruments     13  21  19 12 18 19  13  21  19 
AB test for AR(1)     -2.095  -1.664  -1.201 -0.707 -1.471 -1.532  -2.57  -1.556  -1.417 
Prob (AB test for AR(1))     0.036 0.096 0.23  0.479  0.141  0.126 0.01  0.12 0.156 
AB test for AR(2)     0.996  0.202  0.423 0.181 0.583 -1.064 0.287  0.901  1.069 
Prob (AB test for AR(2))     0.319 0.84  0.672  0.856  0.56  0.287  0.774  0.368  0.285 
Hansen Test of Over identifying Restrictions     14.345 20.568 9.592 8.301  12.151  5.745 11.85  19.504 3.674 
Prob (Hansen Test of Over identifying Restrictions)     0.214  0.302  0.477 0.599 0.668 0.836  0.375  0.361  0.961 
Wald Chi2 Test     107.295*** 141.082*** 35.387*** 93.687*** 95.410*** 98.976*** 121.063*** 119.207*** 32.370*** 
*** represents significance at 1%, while ** represents significance at 5% and * represents significance at 10% 
Standard Errors reported are heteroskedasticity-robust. AB – Arrelano/Bond   17
 
TABLE 4 
DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS BANK PROFITABILITY) 
      Full sample  OECD Countries  Non-OECD Countries 
      (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Return  on  Equity  (t-1)  Coefficient  0.916***  0.959***  0.655*** 0.943***  0.977*** 0.591***  0.850***  0.908*** 0.926*** 
    Std.  Error  0.029 0.035  0.172  0.034 0.075  0.078 0.058 0.078  0.181 
Bank  Size  (t-1)  Coefficient   -0.031  0.048   -0.024  -0.094  -0.109  0.014 
    Std.  Error   0.053  0.038    0.105 0.107    0.103 0.034 
Bank Growth (t-1)  Coefficient      0.926**      0.828*      0.11 
    Std.  Error      0.445    0.485     0.332 
Equity/Assets  Ratio  Coefficient      -0.001    -0.007      -0.008** 
    Std.  Error      0.003    0.009     0.003 
Overhead Costs/Income  Coefficient      -0.022**      -0.031***      -0.014* 
    Std.  Error      0.009    0.006     0.008 
Real GDP Growth  Coefficient      1.385      8.995***      -0.922 
    Std.  Error      1.72     2.559     1.643 
Inflation Coefficient      2.86      2.546      -0.435 
    Std.  Error      2.169    2.407     1.086 
Recurring  Earning  Power  Coefficient      0.061***    0.045***     0.068*** 
    Std.  Error      0.011    0.006     0.013 
Concentration Coefficient      0.962***      0.660**      0.431 
    Std.  Error      0.357    0.277     0.585 
                      
Number of Observations     4625 4625  1763  2766 2766  945  1859 1859  818 
Number of Banks     1522  1522 795 953  953 425  569  569 370 
Number of Instruments     8 16  21  8 14 20 8 16 21 
AB test for AR(1)     -7.803 -7.864  -4  -5.997 -5.734  -2.775 -5.092  -4.97  -3.027 
Prob (AB test for AR(1))     0 0  0  0 0  0.006  0 0  0.002 
AB test for AR(2)     0.994 0.983  -1.176 1.256 1.249  0.239 0.176 0.163 -0.743 
Prob (AB test for AR(2))     0.32 0.326  0.24  0.209  0.212 0.811 0.86 0.871 0.457 
Hansen Test of Over identifying Restrictions     1.94 17.445 17.348  6.11 14.139 5.103 3.379  20.989 14.296 
Prob (Hansen Test of Over identifying Restrictions)     0.963 0.233  0.137  0.527 0.292  0.926 0.848 0.102  0.282 
Wald Chi2 Test     966.360*** 3180.503*** 16647.399*** 787.501*** 3906.085*** 5719.356*** 216.047*** 1868.898*** 7750.279***
*** represents significance at 1%, while ** represents significance at 5% and * represents significance at 10% 
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This figure plots the residuals form our model 1-3 against logarithmic bank size corresponding to results 
reported in Table 3. The upper row draws the residuals of model 1-3 against logarithmic bank size for all 
countries as reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3. The row in the middle plots the residuals of models 1-3 
estimated for the OECD countries only as reported in columns (4)-(6) in Table 3. The bottom row presents 
the graphs corresponding to columns (7)-(9) of Table 3 where we estimate our models 1-3 for non-OECD 
countries only.  
 





























-5 0 5 10 15 20



























-5 0 5 10 15 20



























-5 0 5 10 15 20


























-5 0 5 10 15 20























-5 0 5 10 15 20


























-5 0 5 10 15 20



























-5 0 5 10 15 20























-5 0 5 10 15 20

























-5 0 5 10 15 20
Log ( Bank Size)
 
This figure plots the residuals form our model 1-3 against logarithmic bank size corresponding to results 
reported in Table 4. The upper row draws the residuals of model 1-3 against logarithmic bank size for all 
countries as reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 4. The row in the middle row the residuals of models 1-3 
estimated for OECD countries only as reported in columns (4)-(6) in Table 4. The bottom row presents the 
graphs corresponding to columns (7)-(9) of Table 4 where we estimate our models 1-3 for non-OECD 
countries only. 
 
Fig. 4 Residual Plots of Profitability Regressions against Bank Size 
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We also examine the effect of other control variables, like equity to assets ratio, overhead 
costs to income ratio, real GDP growth, inflation, recurring earning power, and 
concentration, on bank growth and profitability. For the growth models, as reported in 
Table 3, our results indicate that a higher equity to assets ratio has a negative impact on 
bank growth. This result is significant at the 5 percent level. Other variables do not 
appear to be significant. Regarding bank profitability, we find that an increase in the 
overhead costs to income ratio reduces bank profitability. However, an increase in 
recurring earning power increases bank profitability and increased concentration also 
results in higher profitability. A possible explanation for the positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability is that more concentration may imply more market power, 
which, in turn, may increase profit margins. 
 
 
4. OECD VS. NON-OECD COUNTRIES  
 
As shown in the data analysis section, the structure of the banking system of OECD 
countries is quite different from that of non-OECD countries. Therefore, we think it is 
interesting to estimate models 1-3 for both groups of countries. Our samples for OECD 
and non-OECD countries contain more than 900 and 500 banks, respectively. However, 
because of the unavailability of data for some control variables, the number of banks 
drops in model 3 (with all control variables). Table 3 presents the results for bank growth 
for OECD countries in columns (4)-(6) and for non-OECD countries in columns (7)-(9). 
For both samples, the models are significant at 1 percent level of significance as shown 
by the Wald chi-square test. Moreover, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
always appears insignificant implying that the null hypothesis of correct population 
moment conditions is not rejected. This result points at the validity and exogeneity of the 
instruments. The Arellano-Bond test for the first difference autoregressive process 
appears to be significant and the test for the second difference autoregressive process is 
insignificant implying that our modeling techniques are suitable. 
The main difference between the two subsamples is that bank size is not 
significant in all models for bank growth for non-OECD countries. In contrast, for OECD 
countries the coefficient of bank size comes up with a negative sign and is significantly   21
different from zero. Similarly, the equity to assets ratio is significant at the 1 percent level 
for OECD countries, whereas it is only significant at the 10 percent level for non-OECD 
countries. Recall that in the total sample, this variable was significant at the 5 percent 
level.  
Table 4 presents the results for growth in profitability for OECD and non-OECD 
countries. The results for OECD countries are presented in columns (4)-(6) and for non-
OECD countries in columns (7)-(9). The significance of the Wald-Chi-square tests, at 1 
percent level of significance, implies that all models are significant for both OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Similarly, the insignificance of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restriction implies that the instruments are exogenous. The Arellano-Bond test results for 
differences in first-order and second-order autoregressive process indicate no 
autoregressive process at second stage.  
The effect of lagged profitability remains significant for both OECD and non-
OECD countries, indicating persistence of bank profitability. Similarly, the effect of bank 
size appears insignificant for both OECD and non-OECD countries, which implies that 
bank size does not affect growth of profitability. However, lagged bank growth does not 
have a significant impact on bank profitability for banks located in non-OECD countries. 
A possible explanation for this result can be a weakness in the banking firms, which 
cannot channel growth into profitability.  
Most results concerning the control variables in the models for the subsamples are 
similar to our results for the overall sample. However, one interesting difference is that 
concentration does not result in higher profitability in non-OECD countries. This could 
reflect the presence of a few large unprofitable banks. As pointed out by others (see, e.g., 
Bonin et al., 2005), some non-OECD countries have large state-run banks with low 
profitability. A second interesting difference is that real GDP growth appears significant 
for banks in OECD countries with the expected positive sign but is insignificant for banks 
located in non-OECD countries. The insignificance of GDP growth for bank profitability 
has been documented before (see, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1999). In line with our 
findings, Bikker and Hu (2003) report a positive impact of GDP growth on bank 
profitability of 26 industrial countries.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We examine Gibrat’s ‘Law of Proportionate Effect’ for more than 1500 banks from 65 
OECD and non-OECD countries. Following Goddard et al. (2004a, 2004b), we also 
analyze the linkages between bank growth and profitability. Our analysis shows that 
concentration in the banking sector has decreased in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries, but non-OECD countries still have a more peaked distribution of banks. We 
model bank size and profitability growth using the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step 
GMM approach. Our findings suggest that (i) bank growth is not persistent, (ii) bank 
profitability is persistent, (iii) bank size does not affect bank growth for banks located in 
non-OECD countries but in OECD countries large banks grow at lower speed (iv) 
variability in bank growth is not influenced by bank size, and (v) smaller banks face more 
variation in profitability. Overall these results imply that Gibrat’s ‘Law of Proportionate 
Effect’ does not hold for the banking industry. Additionally, we show that banks with 
lower managerial efficiency observe lower growth in their profitability. Moreover, banks 
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TABLE A1   
COUNTRY-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS IN SAMPLE 
Country Banks  Country  Banks 
ARGENTINA 27  KOREA  (SOUTH)  3 
AUSTRALIA 19  KUWAIT  1 
AUSTRIA 51  LUXEMBOURG  31 
BANGLADESH 6  MALAYSIA  20 
BELGIUM 19  MALI  2 
BELIZE 3  MEXICO  18 
BRAZIL 82  MOROCCO  8 
BURUNDI 1  NETHERLANDS  32 
CANADA 21  NEW  ZEALAND  4 
CHAD 1  NIGERIA  37 
CHILE 10  NORWAY  9 
CHINA (PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC)  58  OMAN  3 
COLOMBIA 12  PAKISTAN  14 
CROATIA 22  PANAMA  52 
CYPRUS 5  PHILIPPINES  26 
CZECH REPUBLIC  8  POLAND  34 
DENMARK 24  PORTUGAL 18 
EGYPT 2  QATAR 1 
ESTONIA 2  ROMANIA  14 
FINLAND 6  SINGAPORE  8 
FRANCE 78  SLOVAKIA  9 
GABON 1  SOUTH  AFRICA  24 
GERMANY 57  SPAIN  47 
GHANA 6  SRI  LANKA  4 
GREECE 19  SWEDEN 17 
HUNGARY 11  SWITZERLAND  55 
ICELAND 4  TURKEY  14 
INDIA  28  UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  1 
INDONESIA 17  UNITED  KINGDOM  91 
IRELAND 20  USA  138 
ITALY 140  VENEZUELA  28 
JAMAICA 6  VIETNAM 14 
JAPAN 26  Total 1569   26
 
TABLE A2  
CORRELATION MATRIX 
















                                   
Assets  1.000                    
Equity  0.952 1.000                   
Asset Growth  0.014 0.012 1.000                 
Return on Assets  0.009 0.013 0.079 1.000               
Return on Equity  0.011 0.012 0.096 0.528 1.000             
Overhead Costs/Income  -0.003 -0.003  0.011  0.006  0.007  1.000           
Equity/Assets  -0.025 -0.011 -0.185  0.095  -0.076  0.000  1.000         
Real GDP Growth  0.035 0.038 0.127 0.005 0.096  0.004  -0.111  1.000       
Concentration  0.014 0.009 0.087 -0.011 0.000  0.008 0.034  -0.005  1.000    
Inflation  0.079 0.044 0.050 0.072 0.043  0.021  0.089  -0.177  0.124  1.000   




 COMPARISON OF BANK CHARACTERISTICS IN TWO SAMPLES 
      Our Sample  World Bank Sample 
  Statistics  Return on AssetsReturn on EquityReturn on Assets Return on Equity
Mean 1.68  11.85  1.31  11.92 
Std. Deviation  5.36  36.46  2.12  11.14 
Maximum 73.17  615.39  8.57  57.65 




















Observations  2991 2989 8076 8076 
Mean 0.76  8.58  1.01  10.30 
Std. Deviation  4.30  26.64  0.74  6.15 
Maximum  73.01  558.26 5.95 102.70 

















Observations 4729  4710  35033  35033 
Mean 1.11  9.85  1.06  10.61 
Std. Deviation  4.76  30.87  1.14  7.38 
Maximum  73.17  615.39 8.57 102.70 







Observations 7720  7699  43109  43109 
   28
 
TABLE A4  
TESTS FOR NORMALITY OF LOGARITHMIC BANK SIZE 
   Non-OECD Countries  OECD Countries 
Year Skewness  Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera Test 
Statistic  Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera Test 
Statistic 
1997  -0.25  4.05 12.23 0.41  4.21 34.25 
1998  -0.14  3.85 6.39 0.64  3.56 25.15 
1999  -0.30  3.58 5.62 0.92  4.75 73.31 
2000  -0.15  3.62 4.35 0.78  4.81 60.96 
2001  -0.43  3.59 11.29 0.82  5.24 90.03 
2002  -0.24  4.05 15.15 0.63  4.41 46.29 
2003  -0.14  4.76 37.41 0.64  4.25 42.92 
2004  0.35  4.15 25.76 0.19  3.31  6.15 
2005  0.56  3.88 32.29 0.20  3.52 13.10 
2006  0.44  3.75 20.07 0.14  3.20  3.37 
2007  0.49  3.79 21.35 0.15  3.35  5.49 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
 
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
  
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009 
 
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
 
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
  
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 
 
2748 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Apostolis Pavlou, Upstream Horizontal Mergers and 
Efficiency Gains, August 2009 
 
2749 Rüdiger Pethig and Christian Wittlich, Interaction of Carbon Reduction and Green 
Energy Promotion in a Small Fossil-Fuel Importing Economy, August 2009 
 
2750 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Monetary Policy 
Transmission and House Prices: European Cross-country Evidence, August 2009 
 
2751 Olaf Posch, Explaining Output Volatility: The Case of Taxation, August 2009 
 
2752 Beatrice Scheubel, Daniel Schunk and Joachim Winter, Don’t Raise the Retirement 
Age! An Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms and East-West Differences in 
Germany, August 2009 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009 
 
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
  
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009 